that is, second best -stationary equilibrium allocation can be implemented in an equilibrium without contingent claims, but with bankruptcy and collateral. This reinterpretation brings new economic insight. If the model has consequences for unanticipated shocks, then the institution of bankruptcy and collateral that may be well suited for "ordinary" shocks may break down when subject to unusual shocks. This is closely related to Leijonhufvud's (1973a) "corridor of stability." Our perspective, then, is quite different from that in the incomplete markets literature or that in the work of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) . In those models, it is hypothesized that bankruptcy and collateral are an inefficient solution to a not completely well-specified economic problem. Here we view bankruptcy and collateral as an efficient solution to the problems posed by ordinary transactions. We also recognize that solutions that may suit ordinary events well, however, may be fragile when exposed to less ordinary events.
A modl "finely carved from the bones of Walras"
We start by summarizing the model of Kehoe and Levine (2001) . There are an infinite number of discrete time periods 0,1, t = … . In each period there are two types of consumers,
1, 2 i =
, and a continuum of each type of consumer. At each moment of time, one consumer has high productivity and one has low productivity. The state {1, 2} t η ∈ at time t is the index of the consumer who has high productivity at that time. This random variable follows a Markov process characterized by a single number 0 1 π < < , the probability of a reversal, that is, a transition from the state where type 1 has good productivity to the state where type 2 has good productivity, or vice versa.
Uncertainty evolves over an uncertainty tree. 
The period utility function u is twice continuously differentiable with ( ) − is the type of consumer who is not type i . Finally, the state indexes which consumer has high productivity, so
There is one unit of physical capital in the economy. This capital is durable and returns 0 r > of the consumption good in every period. We can interpret this physical capital as trees, with r being the amount of consumption good produced every period by the trees. A consumer of type i holds a share 
3. The debt constrained economy: "Venturing stark naked out into the chill winds of abstraction"
Our first model of intertemporal trade is the debt constrained economy. Borrowing, lending, and the sale and purchase of insurance contracts are possible. There are, however, debt constraints. These come about because consumers have the option of opting out of intertemporal trade. If they choose to do this, they renege on all existing debts. They are excluded from all further participation in intertemporal trade, however, and their physical capital is seized. The endowment of human capital is assumed to be inalienable: it cannot be taken away, nor can consumers be prevented from consuming its returns.
Formally, this is a model in which consumers face the individual rationality constraint
This constraint says that, in every state history, the value of continuing to participate in the economy is no less than the value of dropping out. An equilibrium of the debt constrained economy is an infinite sequence of consumption levels and consumption prices such that consumers maximize utility given their constraints and such that the social feasibility condition for consumption is satisfied.
A symmetric stochastic steady state satisfies the equilibrium conditions for an appropriate choice of initial capital holdings 
Kehoe and Levine (2001) prove that every stochastic steady state in which the individual rationality constraint binds on at least one consumer type is symmetric. They also analyze transition paths and prove that the equilibrium reaches the stochastic steady state as soon as a reversal has taken place.
Solution of the debt constrained model
We find the symmetric stochastic steady state by decreasing g c from g ω until we either achieve the symmetric first best at / 2 g x ω = or until the individual rationality constraint binds.
We define a function proportional to the difference between the utility from the steady state consumption plan and consumption in autarky. A recursive calculation shows that this function ∈ .
The function D f is concave and satisfies
∈ . Consequently, the unique steady state is characterized by / 2
In this case, ( There is only one symmetric stochastic steady state.
An interesting question is how the steady state level of consumption depends on the parameter 1 π − measuring the persistence of the shock. From the implicit function theorem, in the case where the debt constraint binds, we can compute
At an interior steady state
When ( ) 0 D g f c = , since the first term is negative, the second term is positive, and since / D f ∂ ∂π is proportional to the second term, it is also positive. We conclude that
implying that a more persistent shock results in greater consumption by the consumer with the high endowment, or, equivalently, less risk sharing between the two consumers.
A numerical example
To see how the equilibrium works in more detail, we examine a numerical example. We suppose that the discount factor is 4 / 5 β =
, that the probability of reversal is 1/ 8 π = , and that the endowments are
There is a single unit of physical capital that produces 1 r = unit of the good every period.
The first-order conditions for the consumer's problem are
and 
Combining this with the first-order condition for 
We construct an equilibrium assuming that capital prices are constant, ( , ') s v v η = . Kehoe and Levine (2001) prove that this is the only possibility.
The first-order condition (15) 
where
Here n q is the price paid for an Arrow security to purchase one unit of physical capital in the case of no reversal.
Consider now that the function 
Notice that we can combine these two conditions to obtain ( ) That is, we should not interpret this as meaning the economy as a whole has become more risky, but rather that the economy as a whole has become more specialized and interdependent.
Because it is less attractive to run away, it becomes possible to enforce more efficient risk sharing.
This negative relation between the variance of income shocks and the level of risk sharing in equilibrium is a general feature of debt constrained models. Krueger and Perri (2006) study the empirical significance of this relation.
The economy with bankruptcy and collateral: "English words that have crept into their language are often used in senses that we would not recognize"
In this section, we show that, when the individual rationality constraint (5) holds, we can support the equilibrium allocation in the debt constrained economy by a combination of bankruptcy and collateral. The possibility of bankruptcy provides a state contingency. The basic idea is that in every period each type makes a loan to the other type. Then the consumers of whichever type has low productivity in the next period default on their loans -that is, they collect the promised payment from the other type, but they do not pay back their own loan.
Bankruptcy comes with a penalty: a consumer who defaults loses any holdings of physical capital and -to prevent consumers who have high productivity from defaulting -loses the returns to labor in excess of b ω . We impose a constraint on borrowing to ensure that consumers do not borrow so much that they violate the individual rationality constraint (5). Notice that the imposition of this constraint makes it possible to impose the bankruptcy penalty of garnishing wages up to the level of b ω : the choices faced by the high productivity type are to not declare bankruptcy; to declare bankruptcy and pay the penalty; or to run away. In equilibrium, the optimum among these three choices is to not declare bankruptcy. ( )
The concepts of equilibrium and of symmetric stochastic steady state for this economy with bankruptcy and collateral are defined analogously to their counterparts for the debt constrained economy. 
Proof:
We explicitly construct the equilibrium. In this equilibrium, consumers who have low productivity always declare bankruptcy and consumers who have high productivity never do.
We use the first-order conditions for the consumer's problem (27) along with the budget constraints and feasibility conditions to construct an equilibrium with these properties.
We first need to determine which consumer purchases the capital. If the consumer with the high productivity purchases the capital, the first-order condition is
which implies that
The first-order condition for the consumer with low productivity is 
If, on the other hand, the consumer with low productivity purchases the capital, the first-order condition in (33) holds with equality, which implies that 
In this case, the first-order condition for the consumer with high productivity is
which holds if and only if the direction of the inequality (34) is reversed. Consequently, we can divide equilibria into two types, along with a borderline case. In the first type, condition (34) holds and the consumer with high productivity purchases all of the capital. In the first type,
condition (34) (32) and (35), coincide.
To keep the exposition simple, we first consider the case where condition (34) holds. We start by writing the budget constraints as
Notice that, although consumers' consumption and asset accumulation depend only on the state in which they are, there are two ways to get to each state: either a reversal has taken place or not.
To construct the steady state equilibrium, we need to compute the asset prices 
which implies that 
Notice that the first-order condition for borrowing becomes 
when the consumer has high productivity. These conditions imply that the borrowing constraints
Combining the budget constraints (37) and (38) with the market clearing conditions for borrowing and lending (28) and (29), we find that
We can easily calculate b and set the borrowing constraint b b = so that the budget constraints (37) and (38) are satisfied:
(1 ) 
Next, we use (32) to calculate the price of capital:
Notice that this implies that 52 0.0750 693
We can now use (40) and (42) 
Kehoe and Levine (2001) provide a simple argument that demonstrates that the equilibrium allocation in the debt constrained model -and consequently the equilibrium allocation in this model with bankruptcy and collateral -is Pareto efficient among allocations that satisfy the individual rationality constraint. Notice how this allocation is supported by borrowing and lending assets with different returns. Proposition 3, which shows that consumers can exploit the contingencies provided by collateral to achieve an efficient allocation, is reminiscent of results in finance, like those of Duffie and Huang (1985) and Kreps (1982) , that
show that a small number of assets can span the uncertainty facing investors. What is important in our model is that the consumers can go long in some assets and short in others. (52, 10) . In this case the consumers with high productivity want to run away, and the equilibrium collapses to autarky.
Even if we devise a scheme to keep consumers from running away in the Kehoe-Levine (2001) sense, we run into trouble as we decrease the variance of shocks still further by setting ( , )
to (50, 12) . In this case, even consumers with high productivity choose to default, and the equilibrium collapses to autarky.
Leijonhufvudian Economics and the Economics of Leijonhufvud
The literature on bankruptcy in general equilibrium typically takes the incomplete markets model as its point of departure. In this model, bankruptcy -like the incomplete markets themselves -is a pathology. Bankruptcy serves to solve no substantive economic problem, and serves only to hinder the proper working of the economy. The only conclusion we can sensibly reach from this literature is that the economy does not work well.
The idea that on a day-to-day basis the economy works poorly is deeply antiLeijonhufvudian in spirit. Leijonhufvud's deepest insight is his (1973a) notion of the "corridor of stability." On a day-to-day basis in modern economies, things work well. It is not plausible that we could all be much better off if not for the nasty facts of market incompleteness, bankruptcy, and collateral.
This paper takes a point of view more consistent with Leijonhufvud's corridor of stability. Here borrowing limits, bankruptcy, and collateral arise to solve a real economic problem, that of providing insurance in the presence of individual rationality constraints. In our account, this economy is second best: given the underlying individual rationality constraints, the equilibrium is the best possible.
Having given a description of the corridor of stability where the economy responds efficiently to ordinary shocks, we are now free to ask the deeper Leijonhufvudian question: How robust are the institutions of bankruptcy and collateral in responding to a shock for which they are not designed? The answer is that these institutions are quite fragile. While the debt constrained complete market economy responds to changes in the variance of the shocks by adjusting the amount of risk sharing, the collateralized economy cannot adjust the risk sharing upwards in response to increased variance of shocks -and collapses completely in the face of decreased variance to shocks. This latter point is of some interest: our general intuition is that reducing the variance of shocks should be a good thing.
